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A Prescription for California's
Ailing Inmate Treatment System:
An Independent Corrections Ombudsman
ARTHUR L. ALARC6N*
[T]he ombudsman symbolizes the use of reason and moral persuasion
rather than force. This is very civilized-and civilizing!'
INTRODUCTION
California's prison system is "totally broken"2 and in urgent need of
reform on many fronts. Most urgent are those reforms taking place in the
areas of prison culture and conditions. United States District Judge
Thelton Henderson recently summarized the situation in Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, when he ordered that the delivery of all medical care in
California prisons be put under federal receivership? The plaintiffs in the
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Over the course of my
career, I have had experience in various roles related to California's prison system. As the Legal
Advisor to Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, I was responsible for conducting investigations to
assist the Governor in deciding whether to commute the sentence of a death row inmate to life
imprisonment. I also advised Governor Brown on all prisoner complaints about the denial of medical
services, intolerable prison conditions such as extremely low temperatures in their cells, and physical
mistreatment by correctional officers. As Chairman of the Adult Authority (California Parole Board
for Adult Men), I reviewed applications for release on parole from prisoners who claimed that they
had received punishment for infraction of prison rules without notice or a hearing. As a member of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, I have reviewed federal district court decisions
relating to prisoners' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of civil rights violations by correctional officers. I
am indebted to my former law clerks, Paula M. Mitchell, a graduate of Loyola Law School, and
Virginia F. Milstead, a graduate of Pepperdine School of Law, for their outstanding contributions to
the research and preparation of this article. Any flaws in the recommendations set forth in this Article
are my own.
i. Stanley V. Anderson, The Corrections Ombudsman in the United States, in INT'L HANDBOOK
OF THE OMBUDSMAN 137, 143 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., i983).
2. Experts assigned to investigate California prisons and report findings to the court described it
as "a totally broken system." Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. 01-1351, 2005 WL 2932243, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. May to, 2005).
3. No. o-I35I, 2005 WL 2932253, at *i (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).
[591]
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Plata class action, filed in 2001, alleged that the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR or the Department) violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving them of adequate medical care at all
California state prisons and by being deliberately indifferent to serious
medical problems In 2002, the defendants agreed to the entry of a
consent decree and to implement comprehensive new medical care
policies and procedures at all institutions.5 The defendants also agreed to
have court-appointed medical and nursing experts assist with the
remedial process.6 By early 2005, however, the defendants publicly
acknowledged that they were unable to correct the unconstitutional
conditions on their own.7 In May 2005, Judge Henderson issued an order
to show cause regarding civil contempt and the appointment of an
8interim receiver. After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Henderson found
that, over the past twenty-five years, California's inmate population has
grown over 50o%, the number of institutions has nearly tripled, and the
"rapid growth of the correctional system was not accompanied by
organizational restructuring to meet increasing system demands. '9 "The
problem of [this] highly dysfunctional, largely decrepit, overly
bureaucratic, and politically driven prison system ... is too far gone to be
corrected by conventional methods."'"
By one estimate, California taxpayers will spend in excess of $44
million defending the Plata matter-with $23.8 million budgeted just for
copying medical files of 157,603 prisoners which must be gathered,
coded, and scanned into a database." Already, over $600,000 has been
paid to court-appointed experts."
Judge Henderson's assessment of California's prisons was echoed by
the Corrections Independent Review Panel (Panel) convened by
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to investigate the prison system. In its
2oo-page report, "Reforming Corrections," the Panel made more than
200 recommendations aimed at remedying the system's more serious
4. See Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d IIOi, iio5 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2003).
5. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *4.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *3-4.
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *3.
to. Id. The prisons need "fundamental reform in a variety of areas, including management
structure, information technology and health care services in order to function effectively and in
compliance with basic constitutional standards." Id. at *3.
ii. Robert Salladay & Greg Lucas, State to Fight Suit Over Inmates' Care: Prisoners' Attorneys
Want Funds Spent on Doctors, Not Lawyers, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2001, at A2 (quoting figures
provided by Donald Specter, director of the Prison Law Office, and the California Department of
Justice).
12. See Docket, Entry Nos. 96, 101, 107, 1i8-q9, I53-54, 16o, 162, 177, 18I, 193, 195-97, 207, 214,
216-17, 219, 225-28, 243, 252-53, 270, 276-78, 284, 290, 297, 302, 315, 317-20, 340, 346, 356, 358, 368,
381,399, 410,416, 421, 424, 439-40, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. 01-1351 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,2005).
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problems.'3 The report described a need for "cultural reform" of a system
in which a "code of silence" and failures in internal investigations protect
correctional officers from being held accountable for wrongdoing,
undermine the objectives of the corrections system, and erode the public
trust.'4 The report also detailed the need for ongoing reform regarding
use-of-force policies.'5 It described prisons as grossly overcrowded, which
increases the likelihood of violent confrontations and undermines
programs aimed at preparing inmates for re-entry into society."
While some of the Panel's recommended changes already have been
implemented, and many are still being considered, sweeping new reforms
are still needed if the entire system is to be overhauled effectively and
brought into compliance with constitutional requirements. The Panel's
report recommends creating an Office of the Inspector General and a
Civilian Corrections Commission that would function in an oversight
capacity to ensure Department compliance with law and policies." It also
advocates the development and implementation of an ombudsman
program within the newly created Office of the Regional Director of the
Department of Correctional Services to act as a liaison to inmates and
family members. 8
This Article proposes creating an independent corrections
ombudsman whose key objective is to foster good public administration
within the CDCR. The current Office of the Ombudsman in the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR
Ombudsman Office) 9 should be severed from the CDCR. While the
current head of the CDCR Ombudsman Office appears committed to the
task of resolving inmate complaints, he is not independent. He must
report to the Director of Corrections, whose employees are the targets of
prisoner complaints of abuse or neglect of medical needs." An
13. CORR. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REFORMING CORRECTIONS ii (2004),
available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/report/indrpt/corr/ [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S PANEL REPORT or PANEL
REPORT].
14. Id. at I9.
15. Id. at 41.
6. Id. at 123-25.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. California's ombudsman program was created through departmental initiative in 1997 as an
agency within the California Department of Corrections (CDC) to work for and report to the Director
of the CDC. In 1998, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code § 5066. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5659
(West). It reads as follows: "The Director of Corrections shall expand the existing prison ombudsman
program to ensure comprehensive deployment of ombudsmen throughout the state prison system with
specific focus in the maximum security institutions." CAL. PENAL CODE § 5066 (West 2005). Prior to the
enactment of § 5066, ombudsmen were assigned to the California State Prison, Corcoran, and Pelican
Bay State Prison in response to allegations of prison guard misconduct. After § 5066 became effective,
four more ombudsman positions were created.
20. In fact, the lack of independence makes the term "ombudsman" in the context of the
California prison system something of a misnomer. By any standard, including those adopted by the
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independent ombudsman, as is recommended by the American Bar
Association (ABA)2' and United States Ombudsman Association
(USOA)," will complement the Panel's objectives of bringing credibility
'and transparency to the administration and its ongoing reform efforts,
while helping restore the public's trust in the system. Creating an
autonomous corrections ombudsman outside the CDCR, with a
legislative mandate to receive, investigate and, where possible, resolve
inmate complaints, would promote and significantly advance the prison
reforms already underway, while reducing the enormous costs of
litigation. Appended to this Article is proposed legislation establishing
such an independent corrections ombudsman.
. By emphasizing practical solutions to prisoner, grievances, rather
than assessing fault, an autonomous ombudsman is well-positioned to
resolve inmate complaints informally, quickly, knowledgeably, and cost
effectively. Over the long term, an independent ombudsman can also
document alleged misconduct or mistreatment. The resulting systemic
and administrative changes would increase prison security and reduce
inmate litigation.
1. AN INDEPENDENT OMBUDSMAN WILL BRING
CREDIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY TO THE CURRENT REFORM EFFORTS
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO
The current CDCR Ombudsman Office receives complaints from
inmates through letters, visits to institutions, collections from "boxes"
that are set up on some prison yards, and from family and legislative
inquiries. 3 The office
provides management advice and consultation to the Director and
American Bar Association and the United States Ombudsman Association, an "ombudsman" must be
functionally autonomous. See Larry B. Hill, Professor of Political Science, University of Oklahoma,
Address at the 1997 Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice: American Ombudsmen and Others; or, American Ombudsmen and
"Wannabe" Ombudsmen (Apr. 18, I997), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/
wannabe.html. The United States Ombudsman Association (USOA) is the national organization for
public sector ombudsman professionals. USOA, About Us, http://usoa.non-profitsites.biz/er
About-Us/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). It provides training conferences and reference information and
publishes a newsletter. USOA, Activities, http://usoa.non-profitsites.biz/en/activities and-services/
(last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
21. See AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 3
(2oo4), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/AL3225oo/newsletterpubs/
I t5.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
22. See U.S. OMBUDSMAN Ass'N, GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS 2 (2003),
available at http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/ReferencesUSOA_STANDARDS.pdf
[hereinafter USOA STANDARDS].
23. E-mail from Ken Hurdle, Lead Ombudsman, CDCR Ombudsman Office, to Arthur L.
Alarc6n, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Nov. it, 2005) (on file
with author).
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makes recommendations to resolve critical issues that impact
departmental policies, procedures and programs applicable to specific
institutions. The Ombudsman serves as a key policy and public
relations expert, with a focus on ethical decision-making, and has
extensive contact with staff, inmates and their families, legislative
bodies and community-based groups. 4
The CDCR Ombudsman's office does not serve as an independent
investigator of inmate grievances. Instead, it was created specifically to
assist the Director of the California Department of Corrections25 and to
provide public relation's expertise to the CDCR.26 Because the CDCR
Ombudsman is not independent, the office does not comply with
recognized ombudsman standards.
The recent case of Rhodes v. Robinson27 illustrates the shortcomings
of the CDCR Ombudsman's office as it is currently structured. Kavin
Rhodes, a California inmate, owned a broken typewriter. s Every time he
sent his typewriter off for repairs, it would be returned with some
additional damage. 9 The corrections officers allegedly were unhelpful in
providing Rhodes with timely service of his typewriter.3" Rhodes filed a
grievance in accordance with the procedures outlined in the California
Code of Regulations." He requested very simple relief: that in the future,
"his typewriter be returned to him in its original shipping containers so
that[,] 'in the event the typewriter failed to function, [he] could assign
blame to the appropriate parties."'32 His grievance was summarily
denied.33
Following, the denial of his first grievance, Rhodes contended that
the correctional officers retaliated by forcing him to relinquish either his
CD player or his television in exchange for his typewriter, which had
recently returned from another round of repairs.34 When Rhodes refused
to relinquish either device, a correctional officer confiscated the CD
24. Office of the Ombudsman, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
http://www.cya.ca.gov/communications/oo.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
25. See Ombudsman's Office, Memorandum to Director of CDC (on file with author). The CDC
is now called Adult Operations and Adult Programs and is part of the larger CDCR, which was
formerly the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. See Gov. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,
REORGANIZATION PLAN 2: REFORMING CALIFORNIA'S YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 5-9,
available at http://cpr.ca.gov/pdf/GRP2.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). These organizational changes
were made pursuant to recommendations by the Governor's Panel. Id.
26. See Ombudsman's Office, supra note 25.
27. 408 F.3 d 559 (9th Cir. 2005).








player and withheld the typewriter.35 Subsequently, Rhodes filed another
grievance, complaining of retaliation. 6 His grievance, however, was not
filed with the prison after it was placed in the possession of the CDCR
Ombudsman.37 The appeal instead was forwarded to the Men's Advisory
Council, an association of inmates with no authority to remedy the
alleged misconduct by correctional officers."'
Rhodes first used informal means to attempt to recover his
typewriter, discussing the matter with the correctional officers'
supervisors.39 One of the supervisors discussed the grievance with
Rhodes's correctional officer, but nothing was resolved.' Another
supervisor requested that Rhodes put his complaint in writing, which he
did.4 That supervisor allegedly never responded to the complaint.42
According to Rhodes, prison officials took further retaliatory
actions.43 This alleged conduct eventually led to the filing of a civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court.' He alleged
that his First Amendment rights were violated in retaliation for his
complaints about his treatment.45 Importantly, one of the CDCR
ombudsmen was named as a defendant and charged by Rhodes as having
"conspired" with the correctional officer defendants to prevent his
grievance from being properly filed.46 The district court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim.47 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.4s
Rhodes's lawsuit has yet to be resolved.4 ' However, the procedural
background of his suit highlights some of the deficiencies in the prison
system's grievance procedure. At substantial cost, a relatively simple
complaint was not resolved at its early stages and snowballed into a
federal lawsuit.
In addition to the problems brought on by the ombudsman's lack of
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 564.
38. Id. at 565 n.6.





44. Id. at 565.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 569.
49. See Docket, Entry Nos. 86-87, Rhodes, 4o8 F.3 d 559 (No. t:02-CV-05 0i8-AWI-DLB)
(demonstrating that as of June 2oo6, briefing of the defendants' summary judgment motion had yet to
be completed, and Mr. Rhodes had filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion to amend his
complaint).
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independence, the office also appears to be underfunded and
understaffed considering California's burgeoning prison inmate
population. With a budget of only $i million, there are six ombudsman
positions in the CDCR to handle complaints of the 166,844 inmates
housed in the CDCR's thirty-two prison facilities-just one ombudsman
for every 27,807 prisoners.
In contrast, consider the examples of the independent ombudsmen
in Iowa and Hawaii. Iowa houses 8577 inmates in its prisons, and its
ombudsman office has a staff of eleven (although several consider
complaints regarding other state agencies in addition to prisoner
grievances).' Hawaii has eight analysts who handle complaints regarding
multiple state and county agencies with approximately half of the
grievances coming from inmates." Hawaii's prison population is 596o." 3
B. AN INDEPENDENT OMBUDSMAN: THE CLASSIC MODEL
The notion of an independent governmental institution designed to
protect the rights and interests of citizens from abuses arising from a
powerful and impersonal bureaucracy is well-rooted in history. In ancient
Rome, for example, the tribuni plebes (tribunes of the plebes) was
established as part of the Roman Republic's constitution to protect the
common people from abuses by the governmental bureaucracy. 4 The
Swedish later emulated the tribuni plebes in the 18o9 Swedish
constitution when they included in it the position of justitieombudsman,
an official charged with monitoring the actions of Swedish officials to
make certain that the laws were administered properly.5 In each case,
the ombudsman was independent of the officials whose actions he was
charged with reviewing. As one commentator explained, "an
50. See E-mail from Ken Hurdle, supra note 23 (providing budget information); Office of the
Ombudsman: Contact the Ombudsman's Office. http://www.cya.ca.gov/communications/
oocontact.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) (providing biographical information for each ombudsman);
DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, MONTHLY
REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT OCTOBER 31, 2005 (2005), available at
http://www.cya.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderlnfoServices/Monthly/TPOPiA/TPOPiAdo5 io.pdf
(providing information regarding inmate population).
51. See IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, IOWA PRISON POPULATION FORECAST FY2005-2015
at 2 (2005), available at http://www.state.ia.us/dhr/cjjplimages/pdf/Forceast-2005-2015.pdf (Iowa prison
population mid-2oo5); Office of Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman Contact Information,
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Ombudsman/staff/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2oo7) (listing the Ombudsmen on
staff at the State of Iowa Office of Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman).
52. E-mail from Robin K. Matsunaga, Ombudsman, State of Hawaii, to Arthur Alarc6n, Senior
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec. 2, 2005) (on file with author).
53. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA Briefs and Background, Drug and Drug Abuse, State
Factsheets, Hawaii, http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/hawaiip.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
54- See Marshall Lux, NEB. PUB. COUNS., THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEBRASKA PUBLIC
COUNSEL: THE OMBUDSMAN 19 (2003), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/reports/ombudsman/
o3ombudsman-o5o3.pdf [hereinafter NEBRASKA ANNUAL REPORT].
55. Id. at 17.
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ombudsman, because he or she is expected to frustrate the will of
powerful people, must be protected by the system from interference by
those who would wish the ombudsman ill."
56
An independent ombudsman protects against abuse through
investigating complaints. The guiding principle in an Ombudsman
investigation is whether the administrative action under investigation is
unlawful, unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, improperly discriminatory,
factually deficient, or otherwise wrong. At the conclusion of the
investigation, the Ombudsman can recommend that corrective action
be taken by an agency. This occurs either specifically in an individual
case or generally by a change to relevant legislation, administrative
policies or procedures. 7
Organizations such as the ABA and USOA endorse the concept of
an ombudsman who is completely independent from the agency he or
she is investigating. Under the standards approved by the ABA, no one
should be able to "(a) control or limit the ombuds's performance of
assigned duties, or (b) for retaliatory purposes (i) eliminate the office,
(2) remove the ombuds, or (3) reduce the office's budget or resources.,
58
An ombudsman should be "creat[ed] by legislation through statute or
ordinance."59 "Creation by administrative fiat such as executive order,
administrative rule, or formal policy contains potential temporal
limitations subject to changes in the mandating authority's term or
whim."'
In order for an ombudsman truly to be impartial, he or she must be
free from conflict of interest, bias, or the appearance of bias. As the
ABA has explained:
The ombuds conducts inquiries and investigations in an impartial
manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest. Impartiality
does not preclude the ombuds from developing an interest in securing
changes that are deemed necessary as a result of the process, nor from
otherwise being an advocate on behalf of a designated constituency.6'
Impartiality "instills confidence in the public and agencies that
complaints will receive a fair review, and encourages all parties to accept
the Ombudsman's findings and recommendations. '' 2
56. Id. at '9.
57. AUSTL. COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, at 8 (2005), available at
http://www.comb.gov.au/publications-information/Annual-Reports/ar2004-05/download/PDF/comma
nrep.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIA ANNUAL REPORT].
58. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 12-13.
59. See USOA STANDARDS, supra note 22.
6o. Id. For example, the CDCR Ombudsman was created through departmental initiative, and
the Ombudsman has found that "[in] the past, some Directors [of the CDC] have used the office
extensively, and others have not." See Ombudsman's Office, supra note 25.
6I. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 3.
62. See USOA STANDARDS, supra note 22, at I.
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C. INDEPENDENT OMBUDSMEN IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Several jurisdictions, including Hawaii, Iowa, and Nebraska, as well
as Canada, England, and Wales, follow the classic independent
ombudsman model. Canada's program is particularly instructive because
its population of thirty-two million is comparable to California's.63
Canada's experience "suggests that prison ombudsmen could function
effectively in American states of comparable population, such as
California or New York. ,64
One of the most important functions of an independent ombudsman
should be the preparation of an Annual Report, describing the office's
cases, findings, and conclusions, for submission to the legislature and the
Governor.6' As the Annual Reports from other jurisdictions with
independent ombudsmen demonstrate, numerous and varied grievances
are resolved informally, and sometimes lead to administrative policy
changes.66 In fact, "the best way to allay misgivings of those who fear that
an ombudsman in prison may be disruptive is to present the experience
of these new offices. The experience is reassuring.
In other states, "[o]mbudsman programs have also been successful at
improving conditions in adult correctional institutions by monitoring the
relationship between inmates and prison officials. Programs are designed
to protect the rights of inmates and staff and to ensure safe and humane
conditions." 68 As noted by the United States Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention:
The presence of an ombudsman has benefitted management as much
63. Statistics Canada, Canada's Population Clock, http://www.statcan.ca/english/edu/clock/
population.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); United States Census Bureau, State and County Quick
Facts, California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/o6ooo.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007)
(estimating California's population at 36.1 million).
64. Anderson, supra note i, at 142.
65. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-16 (2005). For another example, California's Foster Care
Ombudsman (FCO) was created by the legislature as "an autonomous entity within the [D]epartment
[of Social Services (DSS)] for the purpose of providing children who are placed in foster care.., with
a means to resolve issues related to their care, placement, or services." CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE
§ 16161 (West 2oo5). Though the FCO operates within the DSS, it follows the classic ombudsman
model in that it annually compiles data on complaints received and provides the data to the legislature,
along with an annual report that includes a summary of the types of complaints filed, referred,
investigated, and resolved. See CAL. FOSTER CARE OMBUDSMAN OFF., ANNUAL REPORT 2002-2003,
available at http://www.fosteryouthhelp.ca.gov/PDFs/FCOAnnualReport2oo2-2003.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Office of Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman, State of Iowa, Annual Reports,
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/scripts/docmgr/docmgr www.dll/CAO?type-ca (last visited Jan. 4, 2007);
Office of the Ombudsman, State of Hawaii, Annual Reports, http://www.ombudsman.state.hi.us/
Annual%2oReports.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 20o7); Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England
and Wales, Annual Reports, http://www.ppo.gov.uk/annureps.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
67. Anderson, supra note i, at 137.
68. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Use of
Ombudsman Programs in Juvenile Corrections, http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/walls/sect-o2.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Ombudsman Programs in Juvenile Corrections].
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as the inmates. The ombudsman has been a useful control device for
upper echelons, while employees down the line have been able to use
the ombudsman as a means of focusing attention on their pressing
problems.
69
An excerpt from the 2002 Annual Report of the Iowa Citizen's
Aide, Corrections Ombudsman, illustrates the effectiveness of the
independent ombudsman in resolving an issue that was affecting
numerous Spanish-speaking inmates:
It's hard to follow the rules if they're written in another language. That
was one of the concerns brought to our office by a group of Latino
inmates at Anamosa State Penitentiary (ASP). They wrote a letter that
we arranged to be translated into English. In addition to not having
rule books in Spanish, they said Latinos were not allowed to:
* Cell together.
" Speak Spanish in the yard.
* Gather as a group in the yard.
* Have Bibles written in Spanish.
We contacted ASP's security director and an official with the
Department of Corrections' central office. They agreed that Latino
offenders should be allowed to speak Spanish or any other language in
the yard; though they added that offenders should try to reply to an
officer's questions in English, if possible.
Staff also assured us that Latino offenders would be allowed to cell
together; and Bibles in Spanish are allowed. Rule books and important
policies are in Spanish and available in the orientation area or from
their counselor. The security director also posted a memorandum to
security staff reinforcing this information.7'
By serving as a liaison between inmates and prison officials, the
ombudsman was able to clarify existing policies for both parties,
extinguishing the issue before it escalated into a court-filed complaint.
Similarly, an excerpt from the Hawaii Office of Ombudsman Annual
Report for 2003-2004 demonstrates the effectiveness of that state's
program:
VISITOR IDENTIFICATION. A mother complained that she was not allowed
to visit her adopted son, who was an inmate, because she did not have
a Hawaii driver's license or a Hawaii State identification card (ID).
Although she had a current Florida driver's license, her social security
card, a store's membership card, a copy of her birth certificate issued
by the hospital where she was born, and a Hawaii Department of
Education teacher's ID, she was told a Hawaii driver's license or
Hawaii State ID was absolutely required. Since her Florida driver's
69. Id.
70. See OFFICE OF CITIZENS' AIDE/OMBUDSMAN, STATE OF IOWA, OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT 2002, at 13
(2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ia.us/caodocs/AnnualReports/CAWPooo.pdf.
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license was valid in Hawaii, she saw no need to obtain a Hawaii license,
and she was unable to obtain a State ID as she did not have an official
certified birth certificate, which was one of two basic documents
required by the State ID office.
We reviewed the Department of Public Safety rules on this matter
[and] ... noted that the rule did not require that a visitor present a
Hawaii driver's license or State ID to gain entry into a facility. Instead,
the rule provided for the use of various documents and it appeared that
all the documents that a visitor presented were to be considered to
determine the visitor's identity....
[A]fter reviewing the PSD rule, the warden issued a new directive to
the facility staff that [did not require inmates' visitors] ... to present a
Hawaii driver's license or State ID.... Subsequently, the complainant
called to inform us that she was allowed to visit her son.7
The 2004-2005 annual report of the Prisons and Probations
Ombudsman for England and Wales reported the following:
Prisons mirror communities. The everyday problems, disappointments
and annoyances that each of us faces are all encountered behind a
prison wall. But prisons also generate problems of their own, deriving
from the raw fact of incarceration.
Mr. A complained that he had been refused contact lenses. He
explained that he had worn contact lenses for many years and found it
difficult to take part in sport wearing glasses.
My Investigator visited Mr. A. She explained that the prison reflected
the NHS's approach to the provision of contact lenses. It provided free
eyesight tests, free NHS glasses, or non-NHS glasses at the prisoner's
expense. However, should an optician consider that contact lenses
were necessary for clinical reasons, then the prison would arrange to
provide both the contact lenses and cleaning solution. Following this
discussion, Mr. A. accepted that the provision of contact lenses, except
for clinical reasons, fell outside the NHS guidelines.7
Through the independent resolution of complaints, the prison
ombudsman identifies areas where a policy change may be in order and
reports such findings to the legislature, the executive, and the public at
large.73 Publication of an annual report contributes to transparency in the
system by enabling interested parties, as well as the public, to see what
complaints are being made, how they are being resolved, and how
policies have been changed or reversed.74 In Plata v. Schwarzenegger, had
71. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, STATE OF HAWAII, REPORT OF THE OMBUDSMAN (2004), available at
http://www.ombudsman.state.hi.us/2oo3-2oo4.htm.
72. PRISONS AND PROBATION OMBUDSMAN FOR ENGLAND AND WALES ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005,
at iO (2oo5), available at http://www.ppo.gov.uk/download/annualreps/annrep2oo45.pdf.
73. Minnesota's independent correctional ombudsman, for example, has worked effectively with
both the Department of Corrections and inmates and, accordingly, has "produced a more secure and
humane prison environment while reducing costly lawsuits." Ombudsman Programs in Juvenile
Corrections, supra note 68, at 12.
74. The federal government has established several ombudsman programs which are statutorily
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
there been an independent ombudsman with statutory reporting
requirements, the failure of California's prisons to provide adequate
medical care would. have gained public scrutiny. This may have avoided
the filing of this class action four years ago.
D. IMPLEMENTING THE CLASSIC MODEL IN CALIFORNIA
California's existing grievance procedure is contained within the
walls of the CDCR, which has a long tradition of officers respecting an
unwritten "code of silence." In Madrid v. Woodford,"5 another case
before Judge Henderson, the special master charged with investigating
alleged misconduct of prison officials concluded that "[b]ad
investigations and the failure to discipline staff who abuse prisoners
jeopardizes prison security. Likewise, an active code of silence threatens
inmates, honest officers, security and public safety.,
6
Creating an independent corrections ombudsman would give
inmates a method, other than filing an internal CDCR grievance or an
action in federal court, for an impartial individual to address their
grievances regarding alleged abuse or neglect of necessary medical
treatment. It would enhance confidence in the integrity of the system,
thereby contributing to a positive transformation of prison culture. "A
crucial step in the process of translating rights into reality is to open lines
of communication outside the prison walls.""
Under current CDCR Ombudsman practices, no report of the
nature of the prisoner's complaints is submitted to the Governor or the
legislature. No method exists to measure the rate of success in resolving
inmate complaints or to show what the office has accomplished. 8
Recognizing the need for greater accountability, credibility, and
transparency in the system, the Governor's Panel recommended creating
a Civilian Corrections Commission and an Office of the Inspector
General."9 Both of these bodies would report directly to the Governor.
The aim of the Civilian Corrections Commission would be to bring
"public scrutiny and a public voice to correctional policies by approving
policy, bringing correctional activities into the open, and making the
required to submit annual reports to Congress, such as the Citizen and Immigration Services
Ombudsman, 6 U.S.C. § 272(c) (2ooo), the Medicare Beneficiary Ombudsman, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395b-9(c)(2)(C) (2ooo), the Student Loan Ombudsman, 20 U.S.C. § ioi8(f)(4) (2000), and the
Aircraft Noise Ombudsman, 49 U.S.C. § io 6 (q) (2000).
75. Special Master's Final Report Re Department of Corrections, Madrid v. Woodford, No.
C9o-3o94-T.E.H. (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2004), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/
HagarReport.pdf.
76. Id. at 105.
77. Anderson, supra note i, at 138.
78. E-mail from Ken Hurdle, supra note 23.
79. GOVERNOR'S PANEL REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-4.
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correctional system transparent to the public." ' The Office of the
Inspector General would serve as "the independent investigative and
auditing arm of the Civilian Corrections Commission and will also be
responsible for independent oversight of the correctional system."'" The
Governor's Panel recommended that the Office of the Inspector General
be in an authoritative position to conduct audits and stressed that it must
remain independent.
82
Similarly, the Governor's Panel recognized the need for an
ombudsman to handle inmate complaints because the Panel
recommended that the office of ombudsman be placed within the
Regional Director of Correction Services. 8' By following this
recommendation, however, reformers would miss an important and
valuable opportunity to reap the benefits of an independent ombudsman.
Consistent with the recommended reforms, an independent ombudsman
would identify prisoner grievances on a case-by-case basis, in contrast to
the mission of the Civilian Corrections Commission and Inspector
General, which focus on larger institutional and policy issues and
allegations of correctional officer misconduct."' Moreover, the
independent ombudsman would be an excellent source of data regarding
areas where grievances arise. This may assist the Inspector General and
Civilian Corrections Commission in identifying areas in need of policy
reform.
As Professor Stanley Anderson explained:
The ombudsman institution is congenial to any humane philosophy of
imprisonment. While an atmosphere of prison reform is not essential
to the operation of an ombudsman office, it is conducive. In a climate
of prison reform, each new program or service provides a new possible
subject of controversy. Because the correctional ombudsman idea itself
is a reform measure, with a primary focus on the grievances of
prisoners, it is part of the ferment that currently surrounds prisoners'
rights and remedies."5
II. AN INDEPENDENT PRISON OMBUDSMAN WOULD
PROMOTE RESOLUTION OF GRIEVANCES PRIOR TO COSTLY LITIGATION
Fundamentally changing the prison culture will save California
money because improved conditions will reduce the number of inmate
8o. Id. at 8.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 13-14.
84. Cf. Judith Jones & Alvin W. Cohn, State Ombudsman Programs, Juv. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2005,
at i, 6 (stating that Inspector General offices "are concerned primarily with issues such as systemic
waste and fraud and not particularly with individual grievances").
85. Anderson, supra note i, at 138.
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lawsuits."' Poor conditions, like those identified in Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, and inadequate grievance procedures help to explain
why California spends millions of dollars every year defending lawsuits
brought by prison inmates asserting civil rights violations. In 1999, for
example, the Department paid out so much in settlements and judgments
that it exhausted its $15.5 million appropriation three months before the
fiscal year ended."7
A. PRISON INMATE LITIGATION
Defending against inmate lawsuits is no small undertaking. The
correctional law section of the California Attorney General's office,
which focuses in large part on the defense of inmate civil suits, currently
has an annual budget of $14.5 million.ss There are twenty-one attorneys
in the Attorney General's Sacramento office alone who work exclusively
on inmate civil suits.89 The CDCR has an additional budget of $3 million
to employ outside counsel to defend against inmate civil suits.9"
Currently, thousands of actions filed by prisoners are pending in state
and federal courts in California.' In 2004-2005, the state paid $2,767,000
in settlements and judgments to individual inmates and $7,744,000 to
class action litigants.92
Both state and federal legislators recognize the expense of defending
against inmate suits. In 1996, Congress passed the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA") in an attempt to address the ever-increasing
number of inmate lawsuits filed.93 The PLRA creates additional
procedural requirements with which inmates must comply before filing
suits.94 In some cases, the PLRA forecloses suits entirely if the
procedures are not followed or administrative remedies are not
exhausted.95 While the PLRA appears to have led to a decrease in the
number of lawsuits filed, 6 its overall success is questionable. Processing
86. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S PANEL REPORT, supra note 13, at 41 , 49,52, 88.
87. Pamela J. Podger, Spiraling Legal Costs Have Busted Budget of Corrections Dept., S.F.
CHRON., May 27, I999, at A24.
88. E-mail from Edgar Cabral, Fiscal and Policy Analyst, Legislative Analyst's Office, to Arthur
L. Alarc6n, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 26, 2005) (on file
with author).
89. Telephone Interview by Virginia Milstead with Constance Picciano, Attorney, California
Attorney General's Office (Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Picciano Interview].
9
o . Telephone Interview by Virginia Milstead with Kathryn Bernstein, Attorney, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Nov. 14, 2005).
9 i . Picciano Interview, supra note 89.
92. Telephone Interview by Virginia Milstead with Kathryn Bernstein, Attorney, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Nov. 1, 2005).
93. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 8oI-8Io, iio Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of ii, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000).
95. Id.
96. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, s16 HARV. L. REV. 1555, i639 (2003).
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and defending against inmate suits continues to impose significant costs
on the system, averaging approximately $30 million annually at the
federal level.97
The PLRA has not been successful in its objectives of preventing the
filing of non-meritorious suits while allowing meritorious suits to go
forward. 98 Although there are many different provisions of the PLRA
that were intended to filter out non-meritorious suits, such as filing fee
provisions and limitations on frequent filers, one provision aimed at
separating meritorious from meritless suits was the requirement that an
inmate exhaust administrative remedies within the prison system before
filing suit." As Professor Schlanger writes:
With respect to conflict resolution, the exhaustion requirement should
decrease filings because at least some inmates will actually get some
part of what they want in an administrative process and decide they no
longer want to file a lawsuit. As a secondary consequence, the success
rate of the cases that do get filed should go down, as a disproportionate
number of the meritorious cases get filtered out because they succeed
in the grievance process. These results, however, are both apt to be
extremely small. People with experience in inmate grievance systems
emphasize that only a well-designed system can satisfy its users well
enough to substitute for litigation, and there is little reason to think
that the PLRA is encouraging jail and prison administrators to
implement effective grievance systems.'
°
The CDCR grievance procedures currently in place are typical of
the procedures Professor Schlanger described as ineffective in addressing
inmates' complaints.'"' Additionally, the conventional prison grievance
97. In 2000, for instance, federal and state prison inmates filed 25,633 civil lawsuits, or eighteen
complaints for each 100o persons incarcerated. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-
2000, at I (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusdoo.pdf [hereinafter DOJ
REPORT]. It is estimated that those filings cost the United States District Courts $31,166,178. Schlanger,
supra note 96, at 1640. California inmates filed 2836 of those suits, costing federal courts in California
approximately $3.4 million. See DOJ REPORT, supra, at 3. In 2003, there were 24,073 civil suits filed by
state and federal prisoners in United States District Courts. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.4.6 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljfftables.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Facts and Figures]. By
the end of the twelve-month period ending in September 2003, 2574 of these suits were pending in
federal district courts in California. E-mail from Robin Donoghue (June 25, 2004) (on file with
author). Extrapolating from the figures from 2000 and assuming costs remained constant from year to
year, the costs to the United States courts would be approximately $29 million, with $3.2 million borne
by district courts in California. In 2004, 23,449 suits were filed nationally, or sixteen suits filed for each
IOOO inmates. Judicial Facts and Figures, supra, at tbl.4.6. Extrapolating from the 20o0 figures, the cost
to United States District Courts in 2004 would be approximately $28.5 million. These costs are in
addition to those incurred by state and federal governments defending the suits.
98. Schlanger, supra note 96, at 1644.
99. See id. at 1645-47.
Ioo. Id. at 1653.
Io. Cf CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084-3084.7 (2006); Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 623-24
(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing California's appeals process and explaining that, pursuant to the PLRA,
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procedures typically are difficult to navigate and pose traps for the
unwary.
Finally, in some respects the PLRA has simply created another basis
for litigation: whether the inmate plaintiff in fact has complied with its
requirements. Since the PLRA's passage, courts have issued thousands
of decisions interpreting its provisions.' The Supreme Court has
rendered decisions in three cases, one last year. 4 Litigation over whether
the inmate exhausted his remedies is unrelated entirely to the merits of
the complaint 5 and, in instances where the inmate has complied with the
requirements of the PLRA, it adds cost and prolongs the duration of the
action.
B. AN INDEPENDENT OMBUDSMAN WOULD COMPLEMENT THE CDCR's
STRATEGIC PLAN TO REDUCE INMATE LITIGATION
Recognizing that "[w]hen poorly managed or ignored, [prison] risks
translate into injured employees, inmates, or wards and sometimes result
in costly lawsuits or court settlements," the Governor's Panel
recommended the creation of an Office of Risk Management as part of
the CDCR. °6 Its goal would be "to coordinate and implement a
department-wide risk management strategy" aimed at identifying areas
that expose the prison system to liability." The Panel suggested that,
over time, the Office of Risk Management could save money for the state
and reduce lawsuits, but recognized that it would not eliminate the
problem completely. '°8
In January 2005, the CDCR developed a strategic plan in response
to the recommendations made by the Panel's report.'" Part of the plan,
predictably, sought to develop preventive strategies to "preclude class
inmates must comply with it prior to bringing suit), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2oo6).
102. Schlanger, supra note 96, at 165o. Professor Schlanger explains:
Inmates who filed only the first level of grievance, or who failed to comply with a stringent
time limit (sometimes even because they were hospitalized for the injury motivating the
lawsuit), or who simply wrote a letter to prison authorities rather than filling out the
requisite form, are seeing the constitutional cases dismissed for failure to exhaust.
Id. at 1653-54.; accord Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006) (holding that prisoners must
exhaust all available remedies).
103. A LexisNexis search of the Combined Federal & State Cases Database on January 4, 2007 for
"Prisoner Litigation Reform Act" brings up 794 state and federal published and unpublished cases
mentioning the Act.
io4. See Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2378; Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2002).
105. See Schlanger, supra note 96, at 1653.
io6. GOVERNOR'S PANEL REPORT, supra note 13, at 87.
107. Id. at 88.
Io8. Id.
5o9. The Plan was developed by what was then the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. See
YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STRATEGIC PLAN (2005), available at
http://www.cya.ca.gov/communications/docs/StrategicPlanJan2005s.pdf.
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action suits and remedy identified violations." " The CDCR recognized
the need to "proactively identify areas where we are vulnerable to
litigation .... Although the strategies for identifying problem areas are
not concrete, the CDCR intends to "identify and review existing
standards and identify areas in need of standards"; "[r]eview existing
policies to determine their evidentiary and legal sufficiency"; "[d]evelop
and implement a process for auditing standards for compliance";
"[d]evelop a process for ongoing review of policies to ensure compliance
with evolving legal requirements"; and "[d]etermine and implement
strategies for communicating new and revised directives and/or
policies ....
While the reforms suggested by the Governor's Panel and the
CDCR are steps in the right direction, they fail to address the ways in
which grievances of individual inmates will be investigated and resolved.
As a result, even with changes in policy, individual inmates will continue
to file grievances within the CDCR, find the grievance procedure
inadequate, and initiate lawsuits. The creation of an independent
ombudsman's office would implement the reforms called for by the
Governor's Panel by promptly focusing on effectively resolving
individual inmate grievances.
By simply fixing a snafu that adversely affects an inmate early in the
grievance process, small complaints that could otherwise turn into
lawsuits, such as in the Rhodes case, can be resolved."3 For example, an
inmate at Corcoran State Prison requested that prison staff provide him
with a specific type of sesame seed that he needed for a monthly religious
ritual."4 After the inmate tried to resolve the problem within the prison
to no avail, he filed a lawsuit in federal district court."5 It is not clear why
the inmate did not seek the assistance of the Ombudsman."' It may be
that he lacked confidence in the Ombudsman's ability to act
independently."7 The district court contacted the CDCR Ombudsman
and informed him that it appeared that the inmate had a valid claim.
8
The court stated that it was contemplating an award of punitive damages
IIo. Id. at 21.
Iii. Id.
112. Id. at 21-22.
113. This can be done quite efficiently. The Australian Ombudsman reports having finalized 81 %
of all complaints within one month and finalized investigations into 65% of complaints within one
month. AUSTRALIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 14.
114. Telephone Interview by Judicial Extern with Ken Hurdle, Lead Ombudsman, CDCR






of $500,000 if the inmate prevailed."9 The case settled after the
Ombudsman investigated and found that the inmate belonged to a
religious sect that in fact used sesame seeds in a monthly ritual. 2° The
Ombudsman located a source of the seeds and notified prison officials
they must provide the seeds when the inmate needs them.'2 ' The seeds
are kept at the Corcoran prison ombudsman office and distributed when
required by the inmate.'22 This case provides a vivid example of how an
ombudsman can resolve grievances. Ideally, however, such grievances
should come to the attention of an independent ombudsman for
resolution without litigation.
In Walker v. Gomez, prison personnel did not allow African-
American inmates to return to work during a lockdown following prison
riots without an individualized screening for gang membership.' 3
Following one riot, the plaintiff was screened, and it was determined that
he was not a member of a gang.' He was permitted to return to his job
at the prison law library. 5 However, following a second and third riot,
the plaintiff was again excluded from his job until he was screened.I" 6
Prison personnel failed to show why the additional screenings were
necessary.' 7 Without justification for the additional screenings, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had a right to be free from race-based
exclusion from his job. '
In Hearns v. Terhune, the plaintiff complained of poor living
conditions in the prison's disciplinary segregation yard.' 9 He complained
that the disciplinary segregation yard had "'no working toilets, rusted
and insect filled sinks, [and] stagnant pools of water infested with dead
insects.". 30 He also contended that "cold water, which was supplied to
the prison's general population yards, was not available in the
disciplinary segregation yard, despite the fact that the segregation yard's
temperature regularly exceeded one hundred degrees....'. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff stated a claim under the Eighth





123. 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003).




128. See id. at 977.
129. 413 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005).
130. Id. (alteration in original).
131. Id.
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water can be dangerous, thus precluding use of the yard."'32
In an action filed in Nevada, inmate Kenneth Parker wanted to buy
two jars of chunky peanut butter from the prison canteen at a cost of
$5 . 33 The canteen sent him one jar of chunky, but had to substitute a jar
of creamy after running out of the chunky style.'34 The guard took back
the jar of creamy peanut butter and assured the prisoner that he would
be reimbursed for the $2.50 that had been debited from his account.'35
Parker was transferred to another prison and not reimbursed for the item
he had ordered but never received., 6 Parker filed a civil rights action,
demanding a jail term for a prison official and $550o for "mental and
emotional pain."'37 After two years of legal wrangling, the case was
dismissed in 1991 after thousands of dollars were spent by the Nevada
Attorney General's office defending the matter.' 3s This episode surely
could-and should-have been resolved without litigation.
Grievances such as these are not unique or infrequent. In many of
the cases in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in favor
of an inmate who brought a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, an ombudsman likely could have resolved the dispute.
Additionally, an ombudsman may be helpful even when an inmate's
grievance ultimately is without merit. In Ieng v. Fleck,'39 the plaintiff
inmate had entered prison with corneal grafts in both eyes. 40 He
requested, and was denied, safety glasses for use during sports.' While
playing basketball without safety glasses, he became blinded in one
eye. 42 He filed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.43 He
alleged that the doctor who treated him prior to his injury violated the
Eighth Amendment by failing to authorize the issuance of safety glasses
for him to wear while playing contact sports, and by failing to warn him
that he should refrain from playing basketball." The Ninth Circuit held
132. Id. at 1043.
133. See Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort to Limit Filings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1994, at AI, B4.
134. Id.
135. This example was frequently cited in the limited legislative history of the PLRA as an
example of a frivolous suit. See Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (1996) (summarizing facts of the suit).
136. Id.
137. Dunn, supra note 133, at B4 .
138. Id.
139. Nos. 98-36228, 99-35094, 2000 WL 1593397 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000).
140. See Combined Answering/Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 2, leng v. Fleck, 1999
WL 3362 1827 (9 th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-35094).
141. Id. at 2, 6.
142. Id. at 3 .
143. leng, 2000 WL 1593397, at *I.
144. Id. at*1-2.
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that the plaintiff failed to show that the doctor acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs and affirmed the district court's
judgment in favor of the doctor.'4 5 The plaintiff's medical need for safety
glasses was only "serious" if he chose to play contact sports.' 46 The court
reasoned that the doctor "had no duty to provide [the plaintiff] with
safety glasses for the sole purpose of facilitating [the plaintiff's] voluntary
participation in contact sports."'47 Even though the doctor's failure to
issue safety glasses did not violate the Eighth Amendment, providing the
inmate with safety glasses would have avoided four years of litigation.
8
An independent ombudsman may have been able to assess the risk and
persuade prison authorities to take the more cost-effective tack of
providing leng with safety glasses, which would have prevented him from
becoming injured. Instead, denying Ieng's simple request led to his injury
and caused the state to spend thousands of dollars defending Ieng's
federal lawsuit.
In each case, one cannot help but think that, with some independent
oversight, the easily remediable problems presented could have been
resolved-even if not ultimately in the inmate's favor-without the
expense of litigating in the district court and before the Ninth Circuit.'49
CONCLUSION
Appended is proposed legislation establishing an independent
corrections ombudsman in California. The bill is patterned largely after
model legislation drafted by the ABA. It contains commentary
explaining its various provisions.
145. Id. at *i.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id.
148. The plaintiff initiated his suit in 1996, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court in 2000. See id. at *I.
149. Walker and Hearns are not isolated examples. See also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th
Cir. 2003) (plaintiff was classified as a gang member and placed in segregation in retaliation for his
filing grievances); Ashker v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 350 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (department policy
of requiring books and magazines mailed to the prison to have an approved vendor label affixed to the
package prevented many prisoners from receiving books and lacked an adequate justification);
Johnson v. Martinez, No. 02-17101, 68 Fed. Appx. 66, 67 (9th Cir. 2003) (prison officials failed to
alleviate slippery conditions on shower floor for mobility-impaired prisoner); Hagen v. Jabar, No. oi-
56437, 56 Fed. Appx. 302, 304 (9 th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff denied right to attend Jewish services because
he had also attended Muslim services "for academic purposes"); Keller v. Faecher, No. 01-57179, 44
Fed. Appx. 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2002) (prison doctor recommended that plaintiff purchase over-the-
counter medicine while knowing that the prisoner could not afford it); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177
F.3d ii6o, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999) (prison failed to fill plaintiff's prescription medicine prior to his
release). In each of these cases, it is not clear that the inmate ultimately prevailed. However, the
complaints were ripe for investigation and resolution by an ombudsman, even if the result was not
ultimately in favor of the inmate.
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED BILL
An act to repeal Section 5o66 of the Penal Code and to add Sections
5o66.i through 5o66.i6, relating to the establishment of an Office of the
Corrections Ombudsman.
Existing law calls for the expansion of the existing prison
Ombudsman program to ensure comprehensive deployment of
ombudsmen throughout the state prison system with specific focus on
maximum security institutions. The existing prison Ombudsman program
consists of six individuals, all of whom work for the Department of
Corrections.
This bill would create an independent office of the Ombudsman to
receive, investigate, and make recommendations regarding the resolution
of inmate complaints.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 5o66 OF THE PENAL CODE IS REPEALED.
SECTION I. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. SECTION 5o66.i OF THE PENAL CODE
IS ADDED TO READ:
It is the intent of the legislature to establish, in addition to other
remedies or rights of appeal of any person within custody of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under state
law, an independent, impartial state office, readily available to the public
and persons in custody, responsible to the legislature and the Governor,
empowered to investigate the acts of the Department and to recommend
appropriate changes toward the goals of safeguarding the rights of
persons in custody, of promoting higher standards of competency,
efficiency and justice in the administration of state laws.
SECTION 2. SHORT TITLE. SECTION 5066.2 OF THE PENAL CODE IS ADDED
TO READ:
This Act may be cited as "The California Corrections Ombudsman
Act."
COMMENT. The title "Ombudsman" is distinctive from the more
usual official titles such as "director" and "commissioner" and has gained
recognition in the United States and other countries. While existing
statutes in other jurisdictions do not all use the title "Ombudsman"
(Nebraska- "Public Counsel"; Iowa- "Citizens' Aide"; Arizona-
"Ombudsman-Citizens' Aide"), it should be noted that the term
"Ombudsman" is used in these states by the public, the media, and even
by the incumbents, who found other titles could be confused with other
offices and concepts.
The term "Ombudsman" should be used only when the legislation
provides for an independent official who receives complaints against
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government agencies and who, after investigation, may, if the complaints
are justified, make recommendations to remedy the complaints.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. SECTION 5066.3 OF THE PENAL CODE IS ADDED
TO READ:
In this act, unless the context requires otherwise:
"Corrections Ombudsman" or "Ombudsman" means a man or
woman, appointed by the legislature as the corrections Ombudsman, or a
deputy Ombudsman, as selected by the appointed Ombudsman.
"Department" means the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and its subdivisions.
SECTION 4. OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONS OMBUDSMAN ESTABLISHED,
APPOINTMENT, TENURE, REMOVAL, VACANCY, QUALIFICATIONS. SECTION
5066.4 OF THE PENAL CODE IS ADDED TO READ:
(a) The Office of the Corrections Ombudsman is established. The
legislature, by a majority vote of each house in joint session, shall appoint
a corrections Ombudsman who shall serve for a period of six years and
thereafter until a successor shall have been appointed. The Ombudsman
may be reappointed but may not serve for more than three terms. The
legislature, by two-thirds vote of the members in joint session, may
remove or suspend the Ombudsman from office, but only for neglect of
duty, misconduct, or disability. The Office of the Corrections
Ombudsman shall be independent from the Department and the primary
office shall not be physically located at any Department site.
(b) If the corrections Ombudsman dies, resigns, becomes ineligible
to serve, or is removed or suspended from office, the first deputy to the
Ombudsman becomes the acting Ombudsman until a new Ombudsman is
appointed for a full term.
(c) No person may serve as corrections Ombudsman within two
years of the last day on which the person served as a member of the
legislature, or while the person is a candidate for or holds any other state
office, or while the person is engaged in any other occupation for reward
or profit.
(d) The corrections Ombudsman shall be a person of recognized
knowledge, judgment, objectivity, and integrity, and shall be qualified to
hold the position by reason of education and experience. This may
include advanced education in criminal justice, law, mediation, or other
relevant areas, or experience in security and investigations in corrections
or law enforcement.
(e) It is essential that the nonpartisan nature, integrity, and
impartiality of the corrections Ombudsman's functions and services be
maintained. The corrections Ombudsman and members of the staff of
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the Ombudsman may not join, support, or otherwise participate in a
partisan political organization, faction, or activity, including but not
limited to the making of political contributions. This subsection does not
restrict the corrections Ombudsman or members of the staff of the
Ombudsman from expressing private opinion, registering as to party, or
voting.
COMMENT. (a) The Ombudsman is an appointed officer of the
legislative branch of government. This arrangement helps to guarantee
the independence of the Ombudsman, who might be reluctant to criticize
the actions of agencies that are responsible to the executive, if he or she
were an executive appointee. As part of the legislative branch of
government, the Ombudsman is not only providing a direct service to
citizens, but is also performing a role in legislative oversight of the
agencies under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Since the Ombudsman
may only make recommendations, and may not compel the executive
and judicial agencies to take substantive actions, the Ombudsman's role
is consistent with the concept of separation of powers.
SECTION 5. COMPENSATION. SECTION 5066.5 IS ADDED TO THE PENAL
CODE TO READ:
The Ombudsman shall receive the same salary and benefits as a
legislative agency head. The salary of the Ombudsman shall not be
diminished during the Ombudsman's term of office, unless by general
law applying to all salaried officers of the state.
COMMENT. The Ombudsman is a high-level official who should
receive a salary that reflects the importance, responsibility and prestige
of the office. Also, a high salary is warranted if the Ombudsman is
prohibited by law from engaging in any other occupation, business, or
profession.
SECTION 6. ORGANIZATION OF OFFICE. SECTION 5o66.6 IS ADDED TO THE
PENAL CODE TO READ:
(a) The Ombudsman shall select, appoint, and fix the compensation
of a person as Deputy Ombudsman and may select, appoint, and fix the
compensation of such other officers and employees as the Ombudsman
may deem necessary to discharge the Ombudsman's responsibilities
under this Act. Deputy Ombudsman shall be qualified as described in
Section 5 o66.4(d) and (e) of this chapter. Compensation shall be fixed
within the amount available by appropriation. All officers and employees
shall serve at the Ombudsman's pleasure.
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(b) The Ombudsman may delegate to staff members any authority,
power, or duty except this power of delegation and the Ombudsman's
duty to make any report under this Act. However, the Ombudsman may
authorize the Deputy Ombudsman to act in the Ombudsman's stead in
the event of illness, absence, leave, or disability, or when, in the
Ombudsman's sole discretion, an appearance of impropriety, partiality,
or a conflict of interest prevents the Ombudsman from discharging his or
her duty in a particular matter.
(c) The Ombudsman and his or her staff shall be entitled to
participate in any employee benefit or retirement plan available to state
employees.
(d) The Ombudsman shall prepare and administer a budget for the
office of the Ombudsman.
COMMENT. (a) The sensitive nature of the work and the high degree
of delegation to and confidence in staff that will be required dictate that
the Ombudsman be free of civil service and political constraints in staff
selection and retention. The Ombudsman, however, should refer to civil
service salary schedules in setting comparable salaries for staff, and
would naturally use state accounting facilities for payment of such. The
appointment of a Deputy Ombudsman is compulsory while selection of
other officials, including an Assistant Ombudsman or Ombudsmen, is
optional.
(b) This same desire for flexibility should permit a broad delegation
of powers. The Ombudsman, however, remains responsible for the
organization of the office and for whatever reports leave the office unless
the Deputy Ombudsman has assumed the Ombudsman's duties under
this sub-section or when the office is vacant. The Ombudsman has
complete discretion with respect to recusal for "cause" in order to avoid
procedural smoke screens and because the Ombudsman can be expected
to diligently maintain his or her limited authority through appropriate
recusal. The Ombudsman has discretion to require that a delegation be
in writing or that staff members take an oath of office.
SECTION 7. DUTIES OF THE CORRECTIONS OMBUDSMAN. SECTION 5066.7
IS ADDED TO THE PENAL CODE TO READ:
(a) The corrections Ombudsman shall be responsible for receiving,
investigating, and making recommendations regarding the resolution of
complaints received from individuals, including inmates of the
Department, family members of inmates, members of the state
legislature, and the general public. The corrections Ombudsman may
also investigate issues related to inmate health or safety on his or her
own initiative.
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(b) In selecting matters for attention, the corrections Ombudsman
shall address him or herself particularly to acts of the Department that
may be: (i) contrary to law or regulation; (2) unreasonable, unfair,
oppressive, or inconsistent with the general course of the Department's
judgments; (3) mistaken in law or arbitrary in ascertainment of fact;
(4) improper in motivation or based on irrelevant considerations; or
(5) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been
revealed.
(c) The Ombudsman in the Ombudsman's discretion may decide not
to investigate because: (i) the complainant could reasonably be expected
to use another remedy or channel; (2) the complaint is trivial, frivolous,
vexatious, or not made in good faith; (3) the complaint has been too long
delayed to justify present examination; (4) the complainant is not
personally aggrieved by the subject matter of the complaint; (5)
resources are insufficient for adequate investigation; or (6) other
complaints are more worthy of attention.
(d) The Ombudsman's declining to investigate a complaint shall not
bar the Ombudsman from proceeding on his or her own initiative to
investigate an administrative act whether or not included in the
complaint.
(e) The corrections Ombudsman shall not investigate a complaint
from an employee of the Department that relates to the his or her
employment relationship with the department.
(f) The approach to each complaint is tailored to its particular facts,
but the corrections Ombudsman shall address complaints impartially,
and shall not approach cases from an initial perspective as acting as an
advocate for the complainant.
COMMENT. (b) The Ombudsman has a duty to investigate the
complaints described in subsection (b), although he or she may decline to
investigate for the reasons given in subsection (c). The enumerated
complaints indicate the kinds of administrative acts that generate
complaints to the Ombudsman's office. As shown by paragraph (c)(6),
which is a catchall, the statute is intended as a guide to and not a
limitation on the complaints which the Ombudsman can investigate.
(c) The Ombudsman may choose to investigate a complaint even
though the statute permits him or her to refuse. For instance, under
paragraph (c)(I), if the Ombudsman believes that recourse to an
administrative or legal remedy would be futile or overly burdensome to
the complainant, the Ombudsman may investigate the complaint.
Similarly, the Ombudsman may decide to investigate a complaint of
public concern even though the complainant was not personally
aggrieved.
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(d) Complaints which are inappropriate for investigation may
nevertheless reveal administrative acts which the Ombudsman may
decide to investigate on his or her own initiative.
SECTION 8. INVESTIGATIONS, PROCEDURES, COMMUNICATIONS WITH
COMPLAINANTS. SECTION 5066.8 IS ADDED TO THE PENAL CODE TO READ:
(a) The Ombudsman may adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind
rules and regulations required for the discharge of the Ombudsman's
duties, including procedures for receiving and processing complaints,
conducting investigations, and reporting findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.
(b) The Ombudsman shall adopt methods by which to make his
presence and services known to inmates within the custody of the
Department.
(c) The Ombudsman shall advise a complainant to pursue his
complaint with the Department prior to the Ombudsman beginning an
investigation, although the complainant is not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies. An Ombudsman may commence an
investigation prior to the completion of the administrative remedy
process.
(d) If the Ombudsman declines to investigate, the Ombudsman shall
notify the complainant in writing of the reasons for the decision.
(e) The Ombudsman shall, if requested by the complainant, suitably
report the status of his or her investigation to the complainant.
(f) After investigation of a complaint, the Ombudsman shall suitably
inform the complainant of his or her conclusion or recommendation and,
if appropriate, any action taken or to be taken by the Department.
(g) Upon request, the corrections Ombudsman shall have access to
all testimony, information, records, and documents in the possession of
the Department that the Ombudsman deems necessary to conduct the
investigation. The Department shall assist the Ombudsman in obtaining
the necessary releases of those documents which are restricted or
privileged under law. The Ombudsman shall be granted entrance to
inspect at any time any premises under the control of the Department.
(h) The Ombudsman shall have the power to issue subpoenas if
necessary to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of information, records, documents, and other evidence that
the Ombudsman deems necessary to conduct the investigation. The
Ombudsman may only issue a subpoena if he or she has previously
requested the testimony, information, records, and documents in
accordance with subsection (g) of this section and the Department failed
to comply with the request in a reasonable amount of time.
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(i) The Ombudsman may utilize any resources deemed appropriate
during the course of the investigation of a complaint.
(j) The Ombudsman may not levy fees for the submission or
investigation of complaints.
(k) The Ombudsman may bring suit in California courts to enforce
the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 9. CONFIDENTIALITY. PENAL CODE SECTION 5066.9 IS ADDED
TO READ:
(a) The Ombudsman shall maintain confidentiality with respect to
all matters under investigation including the identity of the complainant
and relevant Department personnel, and any persons from whom
information related to the investigation is acquired, except as necessary
in performing the duties of the office.
(b) Before conducting the first investigation, the corrections
Ombudsman shall adopt rules to ensure that confidential information
that is gathered will not be disclosed.
(c) Any written correspondence from the complainant to the
corrections Ombudsman, and any written correspondence from the
Ombudsman to the complainant shall be delivered immediately and
unopened. Telephone and personal contacts between the Ombudsman
and a person in custody shall not be prohibited or monitored.
(d) Documents and records produced in connection with an
investigation of the corrections Ombudsman shall not be disclosed
pursuant to the Public Records Act as codified in Government Code
section 6250, et seq.
(e) The Ombudsman shall not disclose confidential records and shall
be subject to the same penalties as the legal custodian of records for any
unlawful or unauthorized disclosure.
SECTION 10. PROCEDURE AFTER INVESTIGATION. PENAL CODE SECTION
5o66.IO iS ADDED TO READ:
(a) If, after investigation, the Ombudsman is of the opinion that the
Department should: (i) consider the matter further; (2) modify or cancel
an act; (3) alter a regulation, practice or ruling; (4) explain more fully the
act in question; (5) rectify an omission; or (6) take any other action,
including compensating the complainant, the Ombudsman shall state any
conclusions, recommendations and reasons therefor to the Department.
If the Ombudsman so requests, the Department shall, within the time
specified, inform the Ombudsman about the action taken on
recommendations or the reasons for not complying with them.
(b) After a reasonable period of time has elapsed, the Ombudsman
may issue his or her conclusions or recommendations to the Legislature,
the Governor, a grand jury, the public, or any other appropriate
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authority. The Ombudsman shall include any brief statement the
Department may provide if an opportunity to reply is required by
Section 5066.1 I.
(c) If the Ombudsman believes that an action has been dictated by
laws whose results are unfair or otherwise objectionable, and could be
revised by legislative action, the Ombudsman shall notify the legislature
and the Department of desirable statutory change.
(d) If the Ombudsman believes that any Department official or
employee has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary
proceedings, the Ombudsman shall refer the matter to the appropriate
authorities without notice to that person.
COMMENT. (a) Though the Ombudsman will rarely have reason to
make a recommendation if there is no error in what the Department has
done or neglected to do, the Ombudsman should remain free to suggest
improvements in method or policy even when the existing practice may
be legally permissible. This subsection contemplates no entry of
judgment, as it were, but simply the expression of opinion by the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is not a superior official, in a position of
command, and cannot compel a change in an administrative act. The
Ombudsman's recommendation may, however, induce the Department
to exercise whatever power it may possess to right what the Ombudsman
points out as a past mistake.
(b) If the Ombudsman is required to provide an opportunity to reply
under and a reply is forthcoming, the Ombudsman must include it when
issuing findings.
(c) There may be instances where the Department acted in
accordance with existing law, but the law itself produces unjust results.
The Ombudsman has the duty to bring these situations to the attention
of the legislature and appropriate Department officials; if appropriate,
the Ombudsman may comment on or recommend changes in legislation.
(d) The Ombudsman's duty to report wrongdoing pertains to
miscreant officials. This subsection makes it clear that the Ombudsman
may report allegations of wrongdoing without having to first notify the
person involved (who may otherwise flee the state or destroy pertinent
evidence if tipped off prematurely).
SECTION II. RIGHTS OF DEPARTMENT. PENAL CODE SECTION 5o66.ii is
ADDED TO READ:
Before formally issuing a conclusion or recommendation that is
significantly critical or adverse to the Department, the Ombudsman shall
have consulted with the Department and permitted the Department
reasonable opportunity to reply. If the Ombudsman makes a conclusion
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or recommendation available to the Department to facilitate a reply, the
conclusion or recommendation is confidential and may not be disclosed
to the public by the Department unless the Ombudsman releases it.
COMMENT. This section protects the Department, its officers, and
employees by requiring consultation and giving them reasonable time to
reply to significant criticism before the Ombudsman issues critical
findings. The Ombudsman has the discretion to make all or part of his or
her findings available to facilitate a reply. Because the Ombudsman may
modify findings, which may include removal of confidential information
and incorporation of the Department's response, after reviewing the
Department's reply, disclosure of findings not released by the
Ombudsman is a violation of law, which may be dealt with under existing
records confidentiality provisions.
Notice of the Ombudsman's decision to investigate is not required
because such formalities are inconsistent with the role of the
Ombudsman as an alternative to procedure-bound remedies and the
limited resources of the office; are largely ceremonial in that the
Ombudsman will inevitably contact the Department during an
investigation; and are not required by due process given the absence of
Ombudsman power to enforce recommendations and the fact that an
opportunity to be heard is required before publication.
If an advance notice provision is nonetheless desired, it should
provide for: informal or preliminary inquiries without notice, since
experience shows that the vast majority of complaints are handled
expeditiously and informally; withholding notice when notice would
hinder investigation; and flexibility of form to avoid legalistic procedural
wrangling, e.g., "If after making preliminary inquiries the Ombudsman
decides to investigate, the Ombudsman shall suitably inform Department
unless the Ombudsman reasonably believes that advance notice will
unduly hinder the investigation or make it ineffectual. The Ombudsman
may inform the Department verbally or in writing."
SECTION 12. REPORTS. PENAL CODE SECTION 5066.12 IS ADDED TO
READ:
The Ombudsman may from time to time and shall annually report
on his or her activities to the Governor, to the Legislature, and any of its
committees, to the public and, in the Ombudsman's discretion, to the
Department.
SECTION 13. OMBUDSMAN'S IMMUNITIES. PENAL CODE SECTION 5o66.I3
IS ADDED TO READ:
(a) The substantive content of any finding, conclusion,
recommendation, or report of the Ombudsman or member of the
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Ombudsman's staff shall not be reviewable in any court.
(b) The Ombudsman and the Ombudsman's staff have the same
immunities from civil and criminal liabilities as a judge of this state.
(c) The Ombudsman and the Ombudsman's staff shall not be
compelled to testify or produce evidence in any judicial or administrative
proceeding with respect to any matter involving the exercise of their
official duties except as may be necessary to enforce this Act.
COMMENT. (a)-(b) As a public watchdog, the Ombudsman should be
able to state his or her position freely and candidly without fear of
pressure or reprisal. The judicial immunities afforded the Ombudsman
are intended to protect against harassment when the Ombudsman deals
with controversial issues or makes an unpopular decision. While the
Ombudsman's findings are presented only after due consideration, no
claim of infallibility is made and the Ombudsman's findings, conclusions,
and recommendations are always subject to criticism by government
officials as well as members of the public. Since the Ombudsman has no
enforcement power and any findings and recommendations are only
advisory in nature, the courts should have no authority to order that an
expression of opinion be changed.
(c) Certain dealings that the Ombudsman has with complainants and
witnesses may be confidential in nature. This subsection is meant to
protect these confidential relationships so as to encourage complainants
to avail themselves of the Ombudsman's services and witnesses to
cooperate with the Ombudsman, where they may be otherwise reluctant
to do so.
SECTION 14. WITNESSES' PRIVILEGES. PENAL CODE SECTION 5o66.14 IS
ADDED TO READ:
Any person who provides information under this Act may be
accompanied and advised by counsel of his or her choice and shall be
paid the same fees and travel allowances and accorded the same
privileges and immunities as witnesses whose attendance has been
required in the courts of California. However, a representative of the
Department providing information under this Act during business hours
shall not be entitled to receive such fees and allowances.
COMMENT. Although investigations conducted by the Ombudsman
are not contested cases or adjudications of rights or interests, and
although nearly all testimony will be private and confidential, witnesses
who testify (whether or not by subpoena) are given judicial privileges
and immunities. Witness fees and travel allowances are also required for
persons who provide information to the Ombudsman under the Act. A
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provision that a representative of the Department during business hours
shall not be entitled to such fees and allowances is included to avoid
possible double payment of public servants during working hours.
SECTION 15. OBSTRUCTION. PENAL CODE SECTION 5066.I5 IS ADDED TO
READ:
Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the proper and lawful
exercise of the Ombudsman's power, or willfully misleads or attempts to
mislead the Ombudsman in the Ombudsman's inquiries, shall be guilty of
a [specify the level of offense].
COMMENT. It must be determined in each state whether necessity
exists for indicating the court in which proceedings are to be brought and
upon whose initiative. Since fines for offenses vary from state to state
and may be subject to periodic changes, it is preferable to specify the
offense rather than a set amount of fine for a violation.
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